DCI/IC 75-0973

24 SEP 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: DCI Perspectives and Objectives

1. As of this date, the DCI's Perspectives for Intelligence 1976-1981 and his Objectives for the Intelligence Community - FY 1976 remain unpublished.

2. Since USIB and IRAC reviews, comments solicited by the DCI from the Community prior to final publication have been slow in arriving.

Perspectives

Comments have been received from DIA, Army, and Treasury (23 September). Copies were forwarded to Deputy for NIOs and are being reviewed concerning Parts I and II. Items for Part III will be incorporated by ICS pending outcome and completion of NIO work on Parts I and II. No other responses are expected.

Objectives

Comments have been received thus far from two NSCIC members--Gen. Brown, C/JCS and Mr. Ober, NSC Staff. Comment from Gen. Skowcroft, Chairman of the working group is expected.

3. As you know, these principal documents for community guidance interrelate with each other, with the issuance of KIQs, the issuance of DCID 1/2 and with the NFIPR annually. DCI Objectives and related KIQs flow from his longer view Perspectives and should be available to the Community at the outset of a given fiscal year. In this way, community managers are able to adjust their programs at the earliest point in time and a stronger stage is then set for development of the NFIPR.

4. Currently, our planning schedule calls for issuance of DCI Perspectives 1977-1982 in January 1976 followed by the re-issue of DCID 1/2 and issuance of DCI Objectives - FY 77 in March 1976.

5. As you can see, our current situation is presenting a dilemma--one that suggests three options.

Option 1. Press to publish current Perspectives and Objectives in early October. (This means that NIOs must move more quickly than they have in the past on Perspectives I and II.) Leave schedule for January and March 1976 as is.

Option 2. Press to publish current Perspectives and Objectives in early October and slip 1976 schedule to March (Perspectives) and June (Objectives). This will space these publications reasonably and still provide documents in a reasonable timeframe.

Option 3. Press to publish Objectives '76 as soon as possible. Hold on publication of current Perspectives until January and publish as '76-'82 Perspectives. Thereafter, publish Perspectives each January--'77-'83, '78-'84, etc.

6. I recommend adoption of Option 3 because:

a. The Objectives for FY 76 should be on the street now;

b. Publishing Perspectives in October and again in January does not seem sensible (there is likely to be little difference between them), and I'm not optimistic that the NIO office will move as quickly as it should in either case;

c. We can more easily establish January as the standard publication date for Perspectives annually.

7. In the meantime, we have already kicked-off our start on the NFIPR for FY 77--a firm deadline of 5 December with a preliminary to be available in early November for DCI forecast to OMB.

STAT

[redacted]

Acting Chief, MPRRD

Distribution:
Orig. - D/DCI/IC
1 - IC Registry
1 - MPRRD Subject
STAT 1 - [redacted] Chrono
STAT IC/MPRRD: [redacted] (24Sep75)

Prod. 5(2)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVES FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 1976-1981

Introduction

1. Perspectives for Intelligence, looking five years into the future, are issued annually by the Director of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for all elements of the Intelligence Community. In particular, these statements of perspectives are designed to stimulate early action and planning on programs requiring long developmental lead times prior to their execution--such as complex technical systems, language training, the augmentation of skills, etc. These Perspectives for 1976-1981 are intended to influence Fiscal Year 1976 decisions whose effects will be felt or results fully manifest only after several years. Near term guidance for Fiscal Year 76 is provided in the Objectives the Director has submitted to the President, which included both Substantive Objectives (further articulated in the Key Intelligence Questions) and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence Community will include comments on steps taken during FY 76 to meet future requirements as outlined in these Perspectives.

2. The Perspectives open with a general overview of the international political, economic and security environment anticipated during the coming five years (Part I). This is followed by a broad statement

of the needs the Intelligence Community will be expected to meet during that period (Part II). Finally, more specific guidance is given with respect to activities which should be initiated, or on which planning should commence, in order to meet those needs (Part III).

3. The Perspectives focus on major national intelligence problems. They recognize three important additional categories of problems, but these requirements are not extensively addressed:

a. Continuing national responsibilities of a lower priority which must somehow be satisfied with limited resources;

b. The requirements of civilian and military components of the United States Government for departmental or tactical intelligence support, requirements which also necessitate continuing attention and resources;

c. Unanticipated situations or crises capable of posing major political, economic or security problems for the United States. Since it may not be possible to meet the demands of such unanticipated problems by a reallocation of resources from less urgent activities, some reserve capability must be included in our planning to give the Intelligence Community the flexibility necessary to cope with the problems of an unpredictible world.

PART I - MAJOR WORLD PROBLEMS

1. General. The balance between the US and USSR in the tangible elements of national power, while continuing to be marked by offsetting assymetries, is unlikely to change fundamentally. Perceptions of the less tangible aspects of the balance of power--national attitudes, will, the momentum and direction of international events--may change importantly in either Moscow or Washington or elsewhere. In a situation of rough equality in intercontinental nuclear forces between the US and USSR, other national assets will gain importance as elements of the "strategic" balance of power.

2. While the Soviet-American relationship will still be the most important single factor, it will become less central in world affairs. Power will continue to diffuse, both because of the spread and changes in technology and because of the growth of interdependence, and issues not susceptible to conventional methods of diplomacy or force will grow in importance. The spread of nuclear weapons and the growing demand for raw materials are two processes that will make coercive power available to additional states. These trends, plus a perception of continuing abatement in post World War II security concerns, will work upon the cohesion of postwar alliances, which in turn will reduce the politically

useful super power of the US and the USSR. The United States therefore will be faced not only with a persistent threat to its interests from the USSR but also with turbulence and challenge in its relations with other nations.

3. The USSR. The United States and the Soviet Union will remain principal adversaries during the next five years. Their relationship will probably continue to be marked by an absence of armed conflict and at least public adherence, by both governments, to the concept of "detente." Disagreements between the two powers will continue to abound, however, in the application of this concept to specific problems, and it is not impossible that these disagreements will cumulate to a point where the concept itself loses political support in one of the two states.

The Soviet leaders seem convinced that in the overall "correlation of forces," world events are moving over the long run in favor of the USSR. They will attempt to further this movement through a variety of political, economic, and subversive activities, backed with growing military capabilities and concentrated on the regions around the Soviet periphery. In doing so, the Soviets will be cautious, trying to avoid confrontation with the US and foreign policies so assertive as to jeopardize what the Soviets see as favorable trends in US-USSR relations and world affairs generally. They will also favor the use of

state power in the economic, diplomatic, and conventional military fields over the older revolutionary approach. The USSR will seek to keep "detente" as the leading feature of its foreign policy with the US and Western Europe for at least the next five years, largely for pragmatic reasons--i.e., because they think it offers them more advantages than any other alternative.

- To reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation;
- To control local crises which could lead to general war;
- To minimize China's chances of developing anti-Soviet combinations with other major powers;
- To obtain Western economic and technological assistance;
- To promote the disintegration of US-Allied power blocs; and
- To play a superpower role with the US with respect to world affairs.

The Soviets will have to deal, however, with a number of dilemmas as they attempt to square their long-standing preoccupation with military strength with the minimal requirements of a detente posture. In the field of strategic offensive forces, the modernization program now underway will give the Soviets larger numbers of more

accurate missile warheads, improved missile survivability and greater operational flexibility. In their strategic offensive and defensive programs, research and development is aimed at unique applications of existing technologies and applications of advanced technology based on theoretical or technological breakthroughs. As a result of arms limitation agreements and the Soviet position well behind the US technologically, we do not believe that the Soviets could develop a retaliation-free first strike capability in this time frame. However, in the conventional field, the Soviets will continue to build and modernize their ground, naval, and air forces for theater warfare along the periphery of the USSR and for distant limited operations. These programs will strain the credibility of Soviet professions of peaceful intent, and raise the threat of Soviet supremacy in the conventional field. They are not likely to be substantially restrained by arms control arrangements, although for political imagery they will espouse a variety of disarmament proposals.

In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to give high priority to the kinds of growth which increase national power and facilitate its projection abroad. Domestically, however, pressures will grow for modernizing reforms of the Soviet economic system, particularly its administrative structure. As has been the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe (e.g., Czechoslovakia), reforms which seek the managerial

benefits of some type of demand system could have implications for liberalizing other areas of Soviet life, and will accordingly be highly controversial. Prolonged detente could threaten to erode the pervasive authority of the Communist Party over the Soviet populace. But these are long-standing and chronic problems, and over the next five years the regime is quite capable of resisting unwanted changes in the essentials of the Soviet domestic system.

A key intelligence focus over the next five years will be the Soviet leadership succession, as Brezhnev and the other aging seniors leave the political scene and their replacements consolidate power. Both the new leadership's policy modifications and the relative smoothness or turmoil of the succession process will have implications for bilateral relations with the US and the Soviet stance abroad generally, as well as for domestic Soviet priorities and the Party management of the country. While the odds heavily favor continuity, Soviet politics are so centralized--and so secretive--that significant change under a new leadership cannot be wholly excluded.

4. The People's Republic of China. Almost certainly, China will undergo a change in leadership. The succession could see an initial collegial unity followed by an aggressive, xenophobic leader. Alternatively, the initial period could be followed by the emergence of openly contesting military, Party, and provincial elements. For planning purposes, however,

it would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow-on leadership in China will maintain the unity and authoritarian discipline imposed by the Communist Party, that it will be primarily concerned with internal unity in meeting the social and economic problems within China, and that it will retain a mistrustful attitude toward the outside world and a particular suspicion of countries on its periphery.

China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces and will present an increasingly serious retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980, it will have the capability of threatening the United States with a demonstration (or desperation) strike by a small number of ICBMs and SLBMs. China will maintain large general purpose forces capable of operations on its periphery, and the gap between Chinese military might and that of its neighbors (other than the USSR) will probably widen. China will be unlikely to commit its forces, however, in the absence of major provocation or concern, but given China's sensitivity regarding its Southern Marches, ambitious North Vietnamese behavior or Taiwan's procurement of nuclear weapons over the next five years could generate what the Chinese might regard as sufficient provocation, particularly if either party appeared to be becoming a Soviet ally.

Internally, China will continue its authoritarian economic programs, which are likely to keep agriculture abreast of population, to enable

industry to expand capacity and output, and to support an increasingly modern defense establishment. Internationally, China will endeavor to become the ideological leader of the developing countries. It will participate in aid programs and similar political gestures and will increase its influence, but will not succeed in establishing substantial authority over developing countries.

The chances of major change in the Sino-Soviet relationship during the next five years are small. Nevertheless, the consequences of the present hostility have been so important to Asia and to the US that even a moderate improvement would alter the foreign policy calculations in numerous capitals; obviously, outright military conflict would be a critical world event. Changes in either direction will almost certainly await the advent of new men, but this is likely to occur within both countries during this period, and it will be important to collect information and reach judgments promptly on the proclivities of the new leaderships.

25X1



25X1



25X1



25X1

6. Eastern Europe. While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet control, economic uncertainties and recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with Moscow will complicate the picture. Poor in natural resources, the region is faced with a slowdown in economic growth rates which could have repercussions at the political level. The five-year period could see an explosion within some East European country against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would quickly reestablish its hegemony, by force if necessary, whatever the price in terms of other policies. Less spectacularly, individual regimes may find themselves able gradually to expand some areas of autonomy while adhering to Soviet guidance in foreign policy and security matters. The passing of Tito could open a period of difficulty and contest over the succession and over the external orientation of Yugoslavia, a period that could be risky should the Soviets try to intervene to prevent a westward drift or pull the country eastward.

7. The Middle East. This region seems bound to continue to be both volatile and dangerous. Even if significant progress is made over the next five years in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, considerable distrust will persist, providing a favorable atmosphere for those Arab

elements rejecting a final settlement. A breakdown in the negotiation process is likely to lead to another round of war. As a further source of instability, the policies of important states are strongly dependent on individual leaders--such as Sadat, the Shah, Hussein, and Asad--whose departure could lead to major shifts in national behavior.

The US interests which are threatened by these possibilities are not likely to decline substantially over the period. Arab oil may become relatively less important to the US economy, but it will remain vital to our major partners. Meanwhile, the accumulation of oil revenues will magnify the potential for international monetary distortions. While there are important trends which favor an increase in US influence in the region, these trends will remain subject to sudden reversal.

8. Japan. Japan will continue to play a major role in international economic affairs generally, expanding its contacts and relations with other countries, including the USSR and China. Although Japan has a high degree of internal stability, it is feeling the social stresses of intense development and rapid economic growth (e.g., population congestion and pollution, among others). Also, Japan is among the advanced powers peculiarly dependent on imported raw materials and energy sources, and hence is both vulnerable and sensitive to changes in price or availability. Over the next five years, Japan will probably continue to strive to maintain cooperative relations with the United States because of the prime

importance it places on defense and economic relationships. Differences over economic issues--bilateral or multilateral--could sour US-Japanese relationships, and the Japanese will be highly sensitive to indications of reduced US interest in their security.

9. New Powers and Blocs. OPEC's disruption of the non-Communist world's energy situation is likely to inspire further attempts at cooperative efforts by small nations to control other important raw materials, such as bauxite and phosphates. Efforts to form various types of producers' associations by these developing countries already have had important political effects within many industrial consuming states as well as on international economic and political relationships. Whatever agreements are negotiated between producing and consuming countries concerning the supply and price factors for raw materials, the political and economic effects for the international system--including the connections of the Communist states to that system--will be considerable. Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire are becoming important regional powers and are playing more substantial roles in world international forums. Aside from these, several nations whose ties to the US have traditionally been close will display greater independence. This will be particularly prevalent in the economic field but may also affect certain US strategic interests. Examples of such powers are Canada, Mexico, Panama, Australia, and Thailand.

10. The Developing Countries will present other major problems to US policymakers. The nature and severity of these problems will hinge in part on foreign, especially developing world, perceptions of America's ability--and willingness--to succor its friends, to protect its interests and those of its allies, and, generally, to play an active role in areas beyond its borders. Although the fact and even more the manner of Communist successes in Indochina have prompted at least a reconsideration of America's constancy--especially by America's allies on the one hand and her adversaries on the other--it would be easy to overestimate the effects that future events in Southeast Asia and even Korea may have regarding perceptions of American capabilities and intentions held by developing countries generally. The developing countries will be far more concerned with US willingness to support transformations, in their favor, in the international economic and political system.

Nevertheless, developing countries will be most interested in US reactions to events in Southeast Asia and Korea because these situations represent potentially dangerous circumstances which have the potential for generating great power conflict involving the US in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Of other similar situations, the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most obvious, but serious stresses could also develop in the Persian Gulf or in the Indian subcontinent. Additional regional disputes--between China and Taiwan, Greece and Turkey, and blacks

and whites in sothern Africa--could also threaten the tenuous equilibrium between the great powers. The newly rich powers will rapidly expand their military capabilities; some will develop nuclear armaments, however primitive. (Israel already has a nuclear capability; India, South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea could develop one over the next decade, as could other nations such as oil-rich Iran.) If the developing countries do not consider that the US and other rich industrial states are sufficiently forthcoming in closing the gaps between the developed and less-developed worlds, they will seek outlets for their frustration in assaults on the existing international system. The domination by the developing countries of certain international forums will result in increased confrontation and could grow to the eventual incapacitation of these forums as useful international organizations for the industrial states. Also, some sufficiently angry developing countries may resort to attempts to blackmail selected industrial states through terrorism--of a conventional or nuclear variety.

11. Social Change will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem from increased expectations and a perception of the growing rather than narrowing economic gaps between developing countries (and classes within developing countries) and the more developed industrial world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco, India, posssibly Indonesia, the Philippines, and, in Latin America, Argentina,

Peru, Colombia, and possibly even Brazil. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by some authoritarian governments, particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues, but they will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term. Such turbulence will also exist within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological or regional minorities turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent societies.

12. The Acceleration of Events will be characteristic of the years ahead. This will come from improved communications and transportation, sharply reducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful negotiations. There will be a resulting tendency towards breakdowns of overloaded institutions, shorter attention spans for individual situations, and a need for simultaneous perception and management of a multiplicity of international relationships. Such change will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology, but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid basis.

13. Interdependence will be an increasingly important characteristic of the world of the future. This will reflect the increased interrelationship of the fields of economics, cultural communication, and rapidity of physical exchange. Intelligence problems will also be increasingly interdependent, requiring more complex models for analysis to give full weight to the number of disciplines involved. Interdependence will reflect greater national dependence on other nations but will also reflect an increased coincidence of interest among groups, industries, and services in all nations independent of national identification.

PART II - THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

1. General. Intelligence will have to give priority to assessments of an increasing range of problems capable of affecting major American interests and, hence, requiring US decisions. While intelligence on strategic nuclear developments and strategic warning of military attack will continue to receive highest priority, the need will be greater in the next few years for assessments which anticipate and alert decision-makers to other kinds of policy problems. In an era of improved communications and transportation, of a contraction of US forward deployments of forces, and of acceleration in events leading to crises, the demands will be greater for intelligence which is timely, complete and relevant to policy implications. Meeting those demands will be essential for the use of diplomacy, negotiation, and other benign initiatives to head off military confrontations or international instabilities. The central challenge to the Intelligence Community is in providing material which relates directly to the policy concerns of the highest levels of the US Government. To respond to this challenge, it is clear that the large amounts of information available will have to be submitted to analysis of the interdisciplinary type, so that economic, technological, sociological, and cultural factors can be combined with political and military data to provide

US decision-makers with a unified, complete view of the situations which demand their attention--or should demand their attention.

Essential constituents to providing such a unified view include: (1) the description of the perceptions held by foreign decision-makers of the major domestic and international issues with which they are concerned; (2) the presentation of these issues in a context which accounts for all significant factors that impinge upon them; (3) the assessment of the intentions and likely courses of actions of these leaders as well as the capabilities of their countries.

In addition, the Intelligence Community is faced with the requirement to: (1) more effectively identify that which is signficant from the large volumes of raw information, and to put it in manageable form; (2) devise techniques for rapidly and accurately communicating to consumers the essential elements of foreign situations and the reliability of these assessments.

25X1



Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090005-7

PART III. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

1. The Planning Environment. In the early 1970s, the character of substantive problems that had faced the Intelligence Community for more than two decades began to change. The change reflects basically the fragmentation of both sides of the confrontation between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds of the 1950s and 60s, and the increased interdependence of the United States with the rest of the world on military, political, and economic matters. While Soviet strategic threat capabilities, China's military development, and crisis monitoring continue as our major concerns (consuming about three-fourths of our resources, annually), a broader variety of US foreign policy issues are climbing the priority ladder. Significant among these are international energy problems, the complexity of bi-national and multi-national political relationships, economic instabilities around the globe, the availabilities of important raw materials and the threat of extremist and terrorist forces.

The chief concern for intelligence planning in the present period centers on how we manage our resources to cope with this situation, given:

a. Reduction trends since 1969 in our manpower and real dollars available;

b. Increased demands for more timely and better forecasting in intelligence; and

c. A more difficult climate for conducting foreign intelligence created in part by recent public disclosures of intelligence processes and activities.

Intelligence Community resource planning and management is placing increasing emphasis on national plans, [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] They should provide the firm base needed to develop both operating strategies and resource profiles. A parallel emphasis is being devoted to continually improving our requirements guidance and response to our customer's needs through such efforts as the KIQ Evaluation Process (KEP).

2. Guideline For Planning. Even assuming an extended period of detente, the larger portion of intelligence resources will continue to be engaged against our major targets; the USSR, the PRC, and crises. Thus, with no lessening of the importance of what our major Communist adversaries are about, events in both the industralized and lesser developed portions of the non-Communist world are taking on new significance for US security and economic well-being. The likelihood is also greater now than in the past that localized economic, social, political and military events will interact with the real or perceived power relationships of the major power blocs in ways which will engage priority US national interests.

All this has created a busier substantive arena for the Intelligence Community. Not only has there been an increase in the number of problems that require simultaneous handling--and this may increasingly tend to overload some existing mechanisms--there also has been shrinkage of the time available for the Community to recognize and alert policymakers to significant new developments.

Planning for the Community must take on a stronger corporate character. Intelligence program managers need to re-think with one mind our intelligence manpower and dollar situation, operational aims, and end-product requirements. It is a time for ideas and stronger management initiatives that encompass both immediate and long-term requirements. Throughout, our objective is to preserve US technical intelligence advantages over foreign adversaries; the USSR in particular. But we need to prevent decisions that could lock us into long-term commitments or investments with limited alternatives.

In the planning process, managers will find it necessary in some instances to modify drastically a balance of resource allocations and applications where simpler adjustments were sufficient in the past. Decision-makers should be ready to cut away sunk-costs in activities of marginal value. A key function of managers in building Community strength is to engage willingly and frequently with each other in cross-program tradeoffs to reduce unnecessary resource duplications and

functional redundancies. Consolidations, from which lower operational costs and greater functional flexibility can be derived, should be encouraged. Resource applications must be brought into clearer visibility and linked more coherently to substantive intelligence requirements.

The business of intelligence may well require increases in budgetary terms, if only to maintain today's capabilities at current resource levels. Our first responsibility in this area is to assure that cost increases, where they are deemed necessary, are prudent and defensible. The extensiveness of reviews conducted recently by both Houses of Congress in the FY 1976 appropriations process is ample evidence of what will be expected in intelligence justifications in the years ahead. More oversight can be expected from Presidential and Congressional levels--oversight which will involve a more thorough scrutiny of costs, management, plans, and extent of intelligence activities.

Even though we cannot know with certainty what the future will be, planning mechanisms are needed which will allow us to review each step taken in developing a broader intelligence capability.

4. Areas to Address. A thorough review and assessment will be required of each main element in the intelligence process; requirements, collection, processing, production, dissemination, data management, manpower, and research and development.

5. Intelligence Requirements. Intelligence resources throughout the Community are driven daily by the intelligence requirements process. Today, there is a confusing variety of methods and vehicles (even language) used to determine and state requirements. Improvements are needed immediately. A better ordering of requirement priorities is needed across-the-board. Better definitions of requirements will be a fundamental step to overall improvement. The process must become more streamlined and interwoven throughout the Community to assure better, quicker, and lower-cost response to the intelligence consumer. This subject is being given special attention in the DCI's Objectives for FY 1976--but the Community should plan for continued attention and improvement in the out-years.

25X1

25X1



[redacted]

7. Processing. This is still one of the most pervasive problems facing the Intelligence Community. Advanced capabilities in technical collection are still challenging intelligence processing techniques. Higher speed processing methods--rapid selection of non-essential material and faster ways to disseminate critical matter--are particularly important to SIGINT collection systems.

8. Production. Intelligence improvement will not be complete without a tandem development in analysis, production, and presentation techniques. Accelerated efforts are needed in information science research automated data handling techniques, improved analytic techniques, and in the development of electronic tools that the analyst can use easily and effectively in intelligence production. These must be accompanied by equal stress on deepening the substantive knowledge of their subjects by analysts through training, area study and orientation, and language and cultural familiarity. More effective procedures are necessary to evaluate user satisfaction and dissatisfaction with intelligence products.

9. Dissemination. The customers of intelligence will increase. Some will be customers of new specialties in intelligence, such as economics, science and technology, etc. The increase in the value and timeliness of production will also produce a demand for intelligence services to additional elements of our Government which share responsibility for decision-making on the wide variety of questions which will be covered by intelligence in the future. Lastly, we will have increasing situations in which intelligence must be provided to friendly nations, or even exposed to adversary nations, to serve as a basis for negotiation or monitoring of agreements reached. The dissemination of our intelligence must reflect these new demands and be conducted in a fashion which clearly separates the substantive material circulating from the sensitive sources and techniques vulnerable to frustration or termination by adversaries. This will require greater refinement in distinguishing categories of intelligence which can be disseminated to designated audiences from those elements of the intelligence process which must be given greater, rather than less, protection in such a new atmosphere.

10. Data Management. Information and data masses should be made more readily available in a more useful form to all quarters of the Community. There will be larger volumes and increased diversity of information to be handled by intelligence in the years ahead. This will call for:

a. A better appreciation and application by managers of the principles of data management;

b. An upgraded data management system of computers, computer techniques, and communications capabilities; and

c. Development of a Community-wide data management system and standards.

Before these improved capabilities can operate as a unitary system, it will be necessary to standardize intelligence language, data, and computer formats.

11. Manpower. Investment in new talent, training and career development, and exposure abroad may well have suffered in our preoccupation with recent reductions in manpower levels. The years ahead will probably call for different organizational mixes of Community manpower, and almost certainly, a greater breadth of expertise in manpower skills. Organization heads and program managers will be required to formulate plans annually to:

a. Train and familiarize personnel in new and better analytic methodologies--improve the balance of Community skills to meet the demands of a changing intelligence environment;

b. Emphasize and accelerate training in foreign languages and cultures of nations that will be important intelligence targets in the 1976-1981 timeframe;

c. Ensure availability of technical and academic talents and expertise on subjects of importance to intelligence in the 1976-1981 timeframe;

d. Reassess existing manpower commitments against future rather than past or even present requirements, and place major emphasis on the former.

12. Research and Development. R&D continues to grow in importance in the planning and management of US foreign intelligence. Along with R&D initiatives already under way, the IR&D Council should concentrate efforts on:

a. The prevention of surprise in technological progress of other nations--especially by our foreign adversaries;

b. Identification of opportunities and potential problems for intelligence management to address throughout the next decade and beyond; and

c. Surfacing topics and areas of research not included now in the Community R&D effort--topics that should be added to our plans against longer-term problem areas.

13. Summary Areas of Concern. Particular attention should be given by planners to the following:

a. Development of procedures, techniques and systems for improving our ability to anticipate and alert policymakers to likely future events which could prove injurious to US

interests. New elements and issues on the international scene stress the need for a continuously sensitive, national intelligence nervous system--one that will be immediately responsive to warnings, tip offs, and conditions of opportunity;

b. Intelligence products: Continuing reappraisal of our intelligence products--their styling, utility, and level of comprehensiveness to an increased diversity of intelligence matter and consumer needs;

c. Assurance that substantive intelligence needs (rather than momentum of technological achievement and opportunity) is the driving force of investment in our expensive technical collection systems;

d. Development of intelligence operational systems for the future that will be less geographic-dependent or vulnerable to foreign countermeasures;

e. Program planning that is tuned to longer range concerns (5-10 years) and consistent with our developing concept of what the future will demand.

f. Concentrated efforts to develop a stronger relationship between intelligence producers and intelligence consumers.

Above all, flexibility in allocating collection resources and in applying analytical resources must be enhanced. And this must be done within the context of greater intra-Community understanding and cooperation so that the total output of the Community is of the greatest possible value to the nation.

PART IV - IMPLEMENTATION

1. General. The Perspectives for Intelligence will be utilized and reflected in the following Intelligence Community planning and management documents:

DCI Objectives

Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs)

Key Intelligence Question Evaluation Process (KEP)

National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations

National SIGINT Plan

National Imagery Plan

National Human Source Plan

Intelligence Community Annual Report

2. The following bodies will be consulted and participate in the implementation of the guidance contained in these Perspectives, as well as the documents listed above:

National Security Council Intelligence Committee

United States Intelligence Board

Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee

National Reconnaissance Executive Committee

3. As noted in the introduction, these Perspectives are addressed to major national intelligence problems. The additional categories of

problems listed there, which are related to national intelligence but not addressed in these Perspectives, will be implemented by components in the Community following departmental guidance.